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Early and confirming signals of business cycle peaks and troughs are
produced sequentially on a current basis by a system of monitoring
smoothed rates of change in the composite indexes of leading and co-
incident indicators. Evidence is offered that the system would have
identified each of the peaks and troughs of U. S. business cycles since
1949 without undue delays and false alarms. Countercyclical policies
activated and deactivated by such signals would have desirable tim-
ing properties.
COUNTERCYCLICALPOLICY TRIGGERS:
THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING
Thischapter describes a sequential procedure for identifying the
beginning and ending dates of business cycle recessions as promptly
and accurately as practicable. Its origin lies in a study undertaken for
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theEconomic Development Administration (EDA), U. S. Department whi of Commerce, which deals with the problem of designing and testing acco an efficient trigger formula for public works expenditures with the lags aid of a system of cyclical indicators. However, the proposed ap- trig proach can be applied much more broadly to any temporary counter- time cyclical policy program on the national level. wor Federal policy programs of job creation through public works or whi public service employment have been repeatedly called countercycli- crea cal without in fact being so. Most such programs came into effect ma much too late to counter the cyclical rises in the national unemploy- mcii ment rate (which, of course, does not necessarily preclude their being cessi appropriate for other reasons, e.g., because of relatively high levels of ratio unemployment in the intended impact areas). In fact, public works acco programs were not enacted until nine to nineteen months after the
cyclical decline in output had been reversed and that in employment T nearly completed.' For the public service employment programs, the emp
legislative and administrative lags have been considerably shorter, but u s not sufficiently so to produce significant countercycical effects.2 te'
Moreover, no provision was made in any of the programs for effec- still
tive cutoff dates related to signals of the progress of the recovery. In but
sum, the overall lags involved were such that the funds, instead of T
being spent to combat unemployment during recesssions, were actu- fro
ally spent when the expansion of the national economy was already cic
well under way. The
The tardiness of policies designed to stimulate employment not in t
only reduces their intended stabilizing (antirecession) effects but also
induces some unintended destabilizing effects. Government expendi- nat
tures are likely to contribute more to excess demand and inflationary initi
pressures during a business expansion than during a business contrac- mor
tion. Ill-timed fiscal and monetary policies can, of course, have simi- devi
lar effects, date
The success of any discretionary countercyclical policy action de- cyci
pends critically on its timeliness; in addition, it must also have a age
sufficient degree of flexibility. However, the accuracy of economic slow
forecasts tends to deteriorate as the forecast span lengthens and is som
generally not adequate for predictions looking as far ahead as a year this
or more. But shorter predictions of slowdowns and recessions, based som
on the actual record of cyclical indicators with early timing charac-
teristics rather than on forecasts of such series, can be shown to pro- the
vide useful first-alert signals which, when combined with confir- and
matory signals from measures of aggregate economic activity, are used
capable of producing a timely and reliable "triggering" mechanism. some
The main problem with recent public works programs as well as work
other policies intended to be countercycical lies in the long lags withSequential Signals of Recession and Recovery 25
pent which they are initiated and terminated. Most of the total delay is
ting accounted for by the recognition, legislative, and administrative
the lags—which would be eliminated if the programs were effectively
ap- triggered at the onset and at the end of a recession.3 As noted, the
ter- time between the allocation of funds and the employment of half the
workers to be employed is approximately six to twelve months,
or which is not unduly long, given the duration of high unemployment
ycli- created by recent recessions. The solution, then, lies primarily in
fect making the policy action timely by tying it to certain prespecified
1loy- indicator values which reliably signal the beginning and end of a re-
emg cession. The required flexibility can be obtained by advance prepa-
is of ration of a backlog of useful projects to be mobilized progressively
rks according to schedules related to a sequence of increasingly reliable
the signals.4
ent This study relates only to the problem of optimal timing of public
the employment policies in the context of cyclical movements in the
but U. S. economy as a whole. It is recognized that the effectiveness of
ts. the programs depends also on their size, financing, organization, and
ec- still other factors (such as any displacement and spilover effects),
Ifl but these matters lie outside the scope of the present chapter.
of The plan of the procedure consists in identifying certain signals
ctu- from suitably smoothed rates of change in composite indexes of cy-
ady clical indicators, which normally occur in a predetermined sequence.
The possibility of false alarms is reduced by using turning points first
not in the leading and then in the confirming indicators. Actions based
a1so upon the initial turning points should be of a limited and reversible
ndi- nature, involving relatively small commitments of funds. When the
initial points have been confirmed by the subsequent turning points,
more definitive and substantial actions should be taken. The signals
devised in this plan refer directly to business cycles as defined and
dated by NBER, but they also make use of the concept of growth
de- cycles, that is, alternating periods of above-average and below-aver- e a age rates of growth in aggregate economic activity. Since a growth
mic slowdown preceded each recent recession, signals of the former give
some advance warning of business cycle peaks. At troughs, leads of
1ear this type are typically fewer and much shorter, but if the signals are
somewhat late they are also less scattered and often easier to read. ac- In what follows, the rationale of the proposed strategy for using
the cyclical indicators is outlined; the concept of the growth cycle
ir- and its relationship to the business cycle is explained; the procedures
are used and the results obtained thus far are presented and assessed; and





Theproper objective of countercyclical policy programs is to reduce
the number of cyclically unemployed at times of overall slowdowns
and recessions. This might seem to indicate that the policies should 3
be initiated (discontinued) when the national unemployment rate
rises above (falls below) some specified "high" level for some suffi-
ciently long time. Indeed, triggering formulas based on unemploy-
ment statistics have received much attention in recent programs of
direct employment stimulation by fiscal means. But here, as else-
where, policy targets should not be confused with policy indicators.
While the behavior of total unemployment is strongly influenced by
business cycles, it is very difficult to separate the cyclical component
of unemployment from the other components—frictional, structural, and
and institutional. The use of high-unemployment trigger formulas sta
will inevitably cause the programs to be badly mistimed, that is, to put
lag behind recessions and be active during expansions when unem- sh)
ployment may be relatively high for reasons other than cyclical de- (sh
dines or deficiencies in aggregate demand.
An analysis of a variety of labor market indicators shows that they
are strongly affeéted by cyclical changes in the economy, but also as
that most of them are either too sluggish or too irregular in their tim- mo
ing to produce useful signals for our present purposes. However, one
promising option is being explored in another study. This consists cat
of combining several leading and trendless labor turnover series.5 gre The best of the options for a trigger formula, as currently consid- tor
ered, is a plan based on a comprehensive coverage of leading and con- lead
firming indicators of business expansions and contractions. There is out
ample evidence from a long series of studies that important and per- sen sistent timing sequences exist among series in each of the areas
viewed as critical in business cycle theories. The following tabula-
tion illustrates this in a general and selective way.6 rat:
qu
Some of the main factors in Evidence from time series for me
business cycle theories: the corresponding variables: tim
1. Interaction between in- Large cyclical movements in cor
vestment and final demand,business investment commit- for
or between the investmentments (order, contracts) lead
and savings functions, total output and employment; por
smaller movements in invest- Bu
ment expenditures coincide or lea
lag.Money and credit flows (rates
of change) are highly sensitive,
with typically early cyclical
timing; market interest rates
coincide or lag.
The profit variables all show
large and unusually early cycli-
cal movements, and so do stock
price indexes. Unit labor costs
contribute to this result by rising
rapidly prior to and just after a
business peak and falling prior to
and just after a trough.
More specifically, series that represent early stages of production
and investment processes (new orders for durable goods, housing
starts, or permits) lead series that represent late stages (finished out-
put, investment expenditures). Under uncertainty, less binding deci-
sions are taken first. For example, hours of work are lengthened
(shortened) before the work force is altered by new hirings (layoffs).
Other timing sequences reflect important stock-flow relationships
ey involving the demand for and supply of output of goods and services,
also as influenced by changes in business fixed capital and inventories,
money and credit.
one For well-supported theoretical reasons, a selected group of mdi-
ists cators representing a whole set of these relationships has much
greater predictive value over time than any of the individual indica-
sid- tors.7 This insight led to the construction of composite indexes of
Ofl leading, coincident, and lagging indicators which indeed, as anile,
e IS outperform the individual Indicatprs. These indexes incorporate
per- series that represent different economic processes but have similar
reas cyclical timing. The best indicators from each economic-process
ula- group are selected by means pf a detailed scoring procedure incorpo-
rating several major criteria (economic significance, statistical ade-
quacy, consistency of timing and conformity to the cyclical move-
ments of the economy at large, smoothness, and currency). For each
timing category (say, the leading series), the chosen indicators are
combined into an index with weights provided by their overall per-
formance scores.8
Our procedure uses the data from the leading and coincident com-
posite indexes published by the U.S. Department of Commerce in
Business Conditions Digest (BCD) each month. Cyclical peaks in the
leading index often occurred early in the low-growth phases and an-
r
Sequential Signals of Recession and Recovery 27
2. Changes in the supply of
money, bank credit, inter-
est rates, and the burden of
private debt.
3. Changes in price/cost rela-
tions, in the diffusion, mar-
gins, and totals of profits,


















ticipatedthe beginning dates of recessions by variable but, on the
average, rather long intervals, whereas the troughs in the index led fro,
the beginning dates of recoveries by quite short intervals. Reliable of f
signals from the indexes proper, when we take into account the need eco
for some smoothing and confirmation, would occasionally be too
tardy for the purpose on hand. To obtain more timely and depend- a o
able indications, we found it advisable to use rates of change in the sari
composite indexes with the aid of simple smoothing and decision ecoi
rules.9 reso
One such rule that turned out to be effective is that of taking the thai
ratio of the current month's index to the average of the twelve pre- tam
ceding months and expressing the resulting percentage change at a sho
compound annual rate'° This is a smoothed six-month rate, which tren
involves the same loss of lead time as an ordinary six-month change grrji
(where the current month is compared with the single month's fig- resp
ure six months earlier). The two are affected in the same way by any
special factors that pertain to the current month, but the ratio that and
uses the twelve-month centered moving average in the denominator thai
is for this reason much less subject to erratic fluctuations than the F
ordinary rate of change over six-month moving periods.1' atec
Each of the composite indexes published in BCDcontainsa "tar- eacl
get trend" of 3.3 percent per year (0.272 percent per month). The nor
purpose is to make the long-run trend in each index the same and star
equal to the trend rate of growth in the economy as a whole from this
1948 to 1975, so that any differences in the behavior of the indexes whi
are due to short-run factors.'2 Accordingly, the average value of the last
annualized rate-of-change series derived from the indexes over a long sev
period is in each case approximately 3.3 percent. Thus, when the mei
six-month smoothed rates of change described in the preceding para- nat
graph are less than 33 percent, this means that the underlying index pro
is rising at less than its long-term average rate. In the case of the lead-
ing index, this is an indication that a declining phase of the growth gro
cycle is approaching; in the case of the coincident index, that it is gro
probably under way. Likewise, when the annual rates of change nes
come to exceed 3.3 percent, this means that an upswing in the wo
growth cycle may be starting. stai
Growth cycles represent an important but not very familiar phe- age
nomenon which may require some additional explanation. They are 'I
movements in aggregate economic activity defined by the consensus eye
of fluctuations in comprehensive indicators adjusted for their long- firsi
term trends. They are thus composed of specific cycles in the devia- rest
tions from trend of time series representing output, income, trade, ami
employment, and many other economic processes, and they differ bro
sho
_______
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he
led from business cycles in that the latter are defined by the consensus
ble offluctuations in the levels of the same collection of comprehensive
ed economic indicators (see Chapter 5).
00 Abusiness cycle always involves at least one growth cycle, since in
a contraction the short-term growth rate, being negative, is neces-
he sarily less than the long-term growth rate (which for an expanding
economy is, of course, always positive—reflecting the growth of total
resources and their productivity). A business cycle will involve more
the than one growth cycle on those occasions when its expansion con-
re- tains one or more protracted low-growth phases (periods when the
t a short-term growth rate, while remaining positive, falls below the
ich trend rate for a year or so).'3 Consequently, there are some "extra"
ige growth cycles in addition to those which stand in a one-to-one cor-
respondence with business cycles. Since 1945 the U.S. economy has
Lay passed through seven recessions—the latest in the first half of 1980—
at and it has also witnessed three periods of below-average growth rate
tor that did not encompass recessions.
the Each of the seven expansions of the 1945-1979 period deceler-
ated before peaking and ending in a contraction; in other words,
ar- each of the recessions was preceded by a phase of positive but below-
'he normal economic growth. The lags of business cycle peaks behind the
nd starting dates of the low-growth phases lengthened substantially over
this period, from two to six months for the first four of the peaks,
es which occurred in 1948-1960, to eight to thirteen months for the
he last three, which have occurred since 1969. This development reflects
ng several interrelated trends in an economy with an expanding govern-
the ment, intensified inflation, increasing role of services versus goods in
era- natidnal employment, and reduced rates of private investment and
productivity.
tad- Whereas the growth cycle peaks led the business cycle peaks, the
vth growth cycle troughs (marking the transition from low- to high-
is growth phases) usually occurred at about the same time as the busi-
hge ness cycle troughs. Occasionally, as in 1954, a growth cycle trough
the would follow a business cycle trough, that is, the recovery would
start slowly, with the overall growth rate not getting up to the aver-
tie- age level until some months later.
re The NBER reference chronologies for growth cycles and business
us cycles, on which the above statements are based, are presented in the
first two columns of Tables 4-1 and 4-2 for the peaks and troughs,
ia- respectively. These lists of dates have been established by a close ex-
de, amination of time series of levels and deviations from trend for a
fer broad set of comprehensive indicators of real economic activity.'4 It





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)32 Business Cycles I
greatlyin length but averaged about fifty months, that is, about 4.5
times the mean duration of the contractions. In contrast, the growth
cycles that emerge after elimination of the secular upward trend are
nearly symmetrical, with high- and low-growth phases averaging
twenty and eighteen months. Such regularities are attractive to busi-
ness-conditions analysts and increasingly recognized. Certainly, it is
much easier to recognize a developing slowdown than to pinpoint
the date of a future downturn, and this strong presumption is well
supported by lessons from recent forecasts. Since most low-growth
periods do end as recessions, the concept and measurement of
growth cycles can help provide some advance warning of business
cycle peaks. Even though a slowdown may not evolve into a reces-
sion, its recognition gives time for precautionary action. Similarly, it
is more important to stop antirecession action when a rapid recovery
is under way than when a recovery is proceeding slowly.
THERESULTS: A SIGNALING SYSTEM
AND ITS EX-POST RECORD
C,
Thecyclical movements in the leading index tend to occur earlier
than those in the coincident index. Figure 4-1 shows, in a hypotheti-
cal diagram, the smoothed rates of growth in the two series, which
for simplicity will be called the "leading index rate" (L) and the
"coincident index rate" (C))5 Among the earliest signs that an on-
going expaniion may start to decelerate is a decline in the leading
index rate. This development is more decisively indicated when a sus-
tamed decline of the growth rate in the leading index puts it below
the average 3.3 percent line. A similar decline in the coincident index
rate, which would normally occur later, confirms the onset of a gen-
eral slowdown (low-growth phase) and suggests an increased possi-
bility of a business cycle recession. If the leading index rate then falls
below zero and the coincident index rate falls below 3.3 percent (not
necessarily in this order), the probability of recession is heightened.
Finally, if the coincident index rate follows the leading index rate by
turning negative, chances are high indeed that the slowdown is being 2
succeeded by an actual decline in overall economic activity, that is, a
recession.
The expected sequence of signals at business cycle peaks, then, is
when each of the following conditions is first observed:
•First signal (P1): The leading index rate falls below 3.3 percent,















































































































































































































•Second signal (P2): The leading index rate becomes negative, and
the coincident index rate falls below 3.3 percent (L < 0; C < sigi
3.3). ary
I
•Third signal (P3): Both the leading index rate and the coincident are
rate become negative (L < 0; C < 0). by
ing
In Figure 4—1, the vertical links between the two curves remind us wei
that these signals involve prespecified positions or changes in both Tal
index rates. The business cycle peak is expected to occur in the vicin-
ity of P3, that is, no more than a few months earlier or later than diff
that signal. obs
This system of signals would have identified each of the six busi-
ness cycle peaks from 1953 to 1980 (we do not have sufficient data •
available to check the 1948 peak). The average lead at business cycle
peaks was nearly ten months for the first signal, two months for the
second signal. The third signal lagged the peak by an average of one
month. As shown in Table 4-1, the variation of the individual leads
or lags around these averages was considerable, with long advance
warnings before the 1957 and 1980 peaks, very short leads and lags
in 1953, and intermediate situations in the remaining cases. How-
ever, sizable leads prevailed for the first signal, and even the third I
signal involved no long lags. It is important, too, that the sequence of
the signals was maintained in each of the episodes covered.
The first two signals also identified two of the three growth cycle Th
slowdowns that did not become business cycle recessions (the first reo
signal alone identified all three), but the third signal ruled out each was
of these instances. In addition, the system produced four "false at
warnings" that were not associated with either slowdowns or reces- mo
sions, but none of these would have done real harm. Of these cases moi
(listed in Table 4-1), two were single-month declines that related to
the first or second signal only and were ruled out by the third. The
other two were caused by the major steel strikes in 1956 and 1959 alre
and would have been recognized as such at the time.'6 T
At the latest business cycle peak, which on June 3, 1980 was
identified by the NBER as January 1980, the timing of the signals its C
wasas follows: first signal, July 1978, a lead of eighteen months; sec- ture
ond signal, June 1979, a lead of seven months; and third signal, Octo- afte
ber 1979, a lead of three months. trot.
In this instance the third signal, where both the leading and coin- Y
cident index six-month rates were negative for the first time, was ecoi
interrupted in December 1979-January 1980, when the coincident its1
rate turned positive for two months. In February 1980, it becameSequential Signals of Recession and Recovery 35
negativeagain and remained negative through May. Hence the third
signal either gave an advance warning three months before the Janu-
C < ary 1980 peak or a delayed warning one month after the peak.
In interpreting these results, one must allow for the fact that data
lent are not available instantaneously. The indexes are published initially
by the Commerce Department toward the end of the month follow-
ing the month to which they refer. For example, the May indexes
a were released June 30. Hence, in terms of availability, the dates in
'oth Table 4-1.shouldbe placed at least one month later.
c1fl- At business cycle troughs, the signals we have selected are slightly
han different, occurring when each of the following conditions is first
observed:
usi-
lata •First signal (Ti): The leading index rate rises above zero, while
ycle the coincident index rate is negative (L > 0; C < 0). This means
the that the first signal of a trough must follow the third signal of a
one peak.
,ads •Second signal (T2): The leading index rate rises above 3.3 per-
Lnce cent, and the coincident index rate rises above zero (L > 3.3;
lags c>0).
ow-
•Third signal (T3): Both the leading index rate and the coincident
e of index rate exceed 3.3 percent (L > 3.3; C > 3.3).
ycle These signals identified the end of each of the seven business cycle
first recessions between 1949 and 1980, though with more of a lag than
bach was true of the peak signals. The average timing of the three signals
alse at the seven business cycle troughs is as follows: first signal, one
ices- month lag; second signal, five-month lag; and third signal, seven-
ases month lag. The variation around these averages from one cycle to
to another is shown in Table 4—2. There were no false signals of recov-
The ery in any instance in which the preceding business cycle peak had
959 already been identified by the three peak signals.
The lags of the signals at troughs are acceptable because at the be-
was ginning of recovery the level of activity is low (unemployment is at
nals its cyclical peak levels), so that a program of public works expendi-
sec- tures may still be appropriate if it is tapering off and is discontinued
to- after a brief period. While the third signal lags at business cycle
troughs by seven months on average, most of the cyclical expansion
)in- is yet to come. In fact, in none of the seven instances would aggregate
was economic activity as measured by the coincident index have regained
.ent its previous peak level by the time the third signal was reached.'7
ame36 Business Cycles
Hencethe seven -month lag means that recovery is well under way
and not likely to be aborted but has not reached a point where
capacity utilization has become a problem.
Figure 4-2 displays the behavior of the six -monthsmoothed rates
of change in the leading index and in the coincident index relative to
the business cycle peak and trough dates. The crossings of the 3.3
percent trend line and of the zero baseline—which underlie the sig-
nals of these dates as listed in Tables 4-1 and 4-2—are identified.
This allows a visual assessment of the workings of the procedure.
One way to evaluate the set of signals here is to count the number
of months during business recessions when the signals would have
operated in the appropriate way—and likewise during business expan-
sions. Table 4-3 does this for the third signal and shows that it oper-
ated in the correct direction nearly 85 percent of the time between
1949 and 1980. The signal of recession was "on" for about 8.5
years, compared with a total of about five years accounted for by the
six recessions covered (since 1953). The record shows that these
errors were heavily concentrated at the beginning of expansions and
(to a lesser extent) at the beginning of recessions. The recession sig-
nal was always "off" before the economy recovered to its previous
peak level (see text and note 17). In terms of public works expendi-
tures, these are the most tolerable types of error. A brief delay in
turning them off at the beginning of an expansion means that they
will be concentrated during a part of the business cycle when eco-
nomic activity is most depressed and inflationary pressures are apt to
be receding.
This record is very different from the actual performance of public
works expenditures in the past, where a major problem has been that
they have been concentrated in periods of high activity rather than
low. The set of signals described in this chapter should make possible
a significant improvement on past performance in this respect.
Another kind of test is to see how the system works on similar
data for other countries. The leading and coincident indexes cur-
rently compiled by the Center for International Business Cycle Re-
search for six other countries provide the means for such a test. It is
not, however, possible to compare the signals with business cycle
peaks and troughs, because most countries do not have such chro-
nologies. However, chronologies of growth cycles have been estab-
lished by the Center. For an initial test we have selected one period,
1973 -1976, when every country experienced not only a slowdown
but also a recession. The results can be briefly summarized.
1. In each of the six countries (Canada, the United Kingdom,
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Figure 4—2.Six-Month Smoothed Rates of Change in the Leading Index





































949 51 5355 5759 61 6365 6769 71 73 757779 1980















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































occurredin the expected sequence during 1973-1974, and the three
signals of troughs did likewise during 1975-1976. firs
2. At the growth cycle peak in each country, the lag of the first bel
signal, averaged across the six countries, was two months, while the
second and third signals lagged by an average of five and six months, anc
respecti.vely. At the growth cycle trough, the average lags for the six anc
countries were zero, six, and eight months, respectively. cor
3. The system produced no false signals in any country during yea
1973-1976, but in Japan the third signal of a trough was subject to
unusual delay. In this set of indexes, the "target-trend" growth rate Low
for each country is equal to the rate of growth in its real GNP dur- bet
ing 1966-1976. For Japan, this is 7.8 percent per year. The coinci- eral
dent index rate did not reach that level until 1979 and then only stat
briefly, even though a growth cycle trough was recognized in March ider
1975. Growth in Japan has, of course, slowed since the 1973 oil On1
crisis. The growth cycle chronology allows for this change in trend, SlOfl
but the criterion used in the third signal does not. This points to one ther
of the potential problems with the target-trend aspect of the signal true
system, although Japan was the only country where it had a signifi- first
cant effect. aste
m or
In general, the results of this test on data for other countries cor- T
respond well with those for the United States. At peaks the lags are belo
longer than those shown for the United States in Table 4-1, but this afte
is because growth cycle peaks (used in six countries) precede business inde
cycle peaks. At troughs, where growth cycle and business cycle turns 3).
usually coincide, the lags for the six countries are nearly the same as betv
those for the United States. As additional experience is gained, for nals
example, in applying the system on a current basis, we shall be in a 198
better position to appraise its virtues and limitations. W
the c
MODIFYINGTHE SYSTEM FOR USE ticall
WITHCURRENT DATA (P1)
comi
An important limitation of the foregoing tests is that they use his- colur
torical, not current, data. The index series are based on the best in- P2*
formation available at the present time, that is, on figures which, for cons€
all but a few of the most recent months, have undergone several infor
revisions. In actual practice, business analysts and forecasters cannot as th
work with these data since they cannot afford the long delays en- no fa
tailed in waiting for the revisions to be completed. Realistically, the Cr W
choice they have is restricted to using either the preliminary data, type
which involve the least delay but also are the least accurate, or the true sSequential Signals of Recession and Recovery 41
firstrevised data, which add another month to the lag of the indexes
behind the events but improve the quality of the information.'8
Table 4-4 compares the monthly values of the leading index rate
and the coincident index rate as they appeared in preliminary data
and in first revised data. These series begin in October 1976 because
consistent information of this type is not available for the earlier
years.'9
g The leading index rate based on preliminary data (Lv) dipped be-
low the 3.3 percent level intermittently for a total of eight months
between February 1977 and August 1978. These declines were gen-
erally short and shallow, but, under the strict application of the rules
stated above, each of these months is associated with a false signal,
h identified in the table by the symbol (P1) (see columns 1 and 3).
Only in November 1978 did the series L begin signaling the reces-
sion consistently, by falling and staying below 3.3 percent (and soon
thereafter below 0 percent). Accordingly, it is in that month that a
true signal of the peak, denoted as P1, is shown in the table for the
first time (the first appearance of a true signal is marked with an
asterisk). The P1 signal was reported in each of the five following
months.
The coincident index rate based on preliminary data (Cr) declined
e below 3.3 percent in May 1979 and remained below that level until
is after the 1980 recession, thus yielding (together with the leading
index rate) a true second signal of the peak, P2 (see columns 2 and
3). However, C slipped intermittently below zero in four months
between August 1979 and January 1980, producing false third sig-
nals of the peak (P3). The true third signal, P3, is first dated March
a 1980; it stayed on for six months, through August 1980.
When first revised data are used for the leading index rate (Lr) and
the coincident index rate (Cr), the frequency of false signals is dras-
tically reduced. The series Lr shows four months of false first signals
(P1) between January 1977 and August 1978 (columns 5, 7). This
compares with eight such months in the preliminary series L (see
columns 3 and 7). According to the series Cr, the true second signal
P2* occurred for the first time in April 1979 and stayed on for six
consecutive months (columns 6, 7). When one allows for the longer
a1 information lag due to the revision, this timing is effectively the same
as that of the preliminary series C (see columns 3 and 7). There are
no false signals of the P2 type in either Cr or C1r,. Further, the use of
Cr would result in fewer and less confusing false signals of the P3
a, type than use of C would. Finally, the revised data gave the third













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































repeatedit in each of the six ensuing months. This is again equivalent
to the timing of the corresponding signal in the preliminary data
(March-August 1980). The NBER. designated January 1980 as the
business cycle peak on June 3, 1980.20
The trough of the 1980 recession occurred in July 1980, accord-
ing to a recent finding by the NBER (July 8, 1981). Our first, sec-
ond, and third trough signals are dated September and November
1980 and March 1981, respectively, according to the preliminary
data, and September and December 1980 and February 1981 accord-
ing to the revised data. The lags involved, two to nine months, are
similar to those observed in recent recoveries (see Table 4— 2 and
text).
Let us sum up the results obtained at this point: The simple device
of using the first revised instead of the preliminary indexes turns out
to be rather effective in dealing with the problem of false signals (as
exemplified by the data relating to the January 1980 peak). But an-
other approach appears to work better still. It consists in redefining-
thesignaling system by using bands of ± 1.0 percent around the criti-
cal levels of 3.3 percent and 0 percent. This would approximately
allow for the dispersion of the values of the random components of
the composite indexes.2'
Figure 4-3 shows how the "band approach" would work by
means of a schematic diagram analogous to Figure 4-1 (which ap-
plies to the level approach used up to this point). Here the first sig-
nal of the peak, assuming the coincident index rate is above zero,
occurs when the leading index rate declines across the band 3.3 per-
cent ± 1.0 percent. If, after that happened, the leading rate rose
again but stayed within the band (at points like A in Figure 4-3, for
example), the signal would not be invalidated; for the signal to be re-
vealed as false, the leading index rate would have to rise above the
band (e.g., to point B). The second peak signal occurs when the lead-
ing rate falls below the band 0 percent ± 1.0 percent, and the coinci-
dent rate falls below the band 3.3 percent ± 1.0 percent. The third
peak signal is given when the coincident rate falls below the band 0
percent ± 1.0 percent, while the leading rate remains below zero. The
criterion defining false signals is everywhere the same: Backing up
into the band does not invalidate the previous signal; reverse cross-
ing through the band does.
The expected sequence of signals at business cycle peaks, then, is
when each of the following signals is first observed: LJJ.OZI-.
•First signal (P1): The leading index rate falls below 2.3 percent;
the coincident index rate will usually be higher than 2.3 percent,











































































































































































































































•Second signal (P2): The leading index rate falls below—1.0 per- Ia
cent and the coincident rate falls below 2.3 percent (L < -1.0; Mo
C<2.3). C&
•Third signal (P3): The coincident index rate falls below -1.0 per-
cent, while the leading index rate is still negative (L < 0; C <
-1.0).
At business cycle troughs, the first signal occurs when the leading Class
indexrate rises across the band 0 percent ±1.0percent while the co- 44 an
incident rate remains below that band. If, thereafter, the leading rate 3.4-4
falls back within the band (say, to point C), the signal continues to
apply; if it falls below the band (say, to pointD), the signal is taken
to be false. The second trough signal is given when the leading rate -1.0-
risesacross the band 3.3 percent ± 1.0 percent and the coincident 1.1 a
rate rises across the band 0 percent ±1.0percent. The third signal To
occurs when both rates rise above the band 3.3 percent ± 1.0 per-
cent. Again, the criterion for distinguishing false from true signals Note:
remains as defined above. Iish:d
To sum up, the expected sequence of signals at business cycle Condi
troughs is given by the first occurrence of the following:
perce
•First signal (Ti): The leading index rate rises above 1.0 percent perce
while the coincident index rate is less than 1.0 percent (L > 1.0; the t
C < i.0).ATimustfollowaP3. of th
Re
•Second signal (T2): The leading index rate rises above 4.3 per- regist
cent and the coincident index rate rises above 1.0 percent (L > mary
4.3; C > 1.0). at all
•Third signal (T3): Both the leading index rate and the coincident dunn
index rate rise above 4.3 percent (L > 4.3; C > 4.3). of us
- 3,an
To be reasonably successful, the band approach requires that (1) ingt
the proportions of observations that fall into the two bands be small hmin
for both index rates, L and C; and (2) the reverse crossings through Th
the bands be very infrequent for both series. Unless the first condi- timin
tion applies, either L or C or both may meander within the bands, Henc
with the effect of delaying and perhaps obscuring the signals. Unless tion
the second condition applies, false signals will present a problem. cove
Fortunately, the evidence suggests that the two requirements are way
likely to be met by the data. As shown in Table 4-5, less than 7 per- nals
cent of the observations for the leading index rate fell in the band It i
3.3percent ±1.0percent and about 6 percent fell in the band 0 per- of a h
cent ±1.0percent. For the coincident index rate, the corresponding a waClass Interval (% Points)
Frequencyof Observations
















































387 100.0 387 100.0
Note: The measures in this table refer to the series plotted in Figure 4— 2A (for
L) and Figure 4-2B (for C). The series are based on the composite indexes pub-
lished in U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Business
Conditions Digest (BDC) 1979.
percentages are somewhat larger but still moderate: a little over 12
percent and 8 percent, respectively. Thus, the L series was outside of
the two bands 87 percent of the time, and the C series was outside
of the same bands 79 percent of the time.
Returning to Table 4-4, let us inspect columns 4 and 8, which
register the signals produced by the band approach for the prelim-
inary and first revised data, respectively. There are no false signals
at all in either set; that is, no reverse crossings of the bands occurred
during this period of more than four years. This is a major advantage
of using the band signals rather than level signals (cf. column 4 with
3, and column 8 with 7). There is no significant advantage to apply-
ing the band approach to the first revised data rather than the pre-
liminary data (cf. columns 4 and 8).
The timing of the band signals is in most cases identical with the
timing of the corresponding level signals, as shown in Table 4-6.
Hence this method, like the use of revised data, would cause no addi-
tional delay in the signals associated with the last recession and re-
covery. We conclude that the proposed procedure offers a promising
way of dealing with the difficult and important problem of false sig-
nals on a current basis.
It is somewhat surprising that the band signals do not show more
of a lag relative to the level signals, since the two approaches differ in
a way that would seem to suggest the presence of such lags (cf. Fig-
Sequential Signals of Recession and Recovery 47




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































rSequential Signals of Recession and Recovery 49
ures4-1 and 4-2). As a last test available to us, we have therefore
applied the band approach to the historical data extending back to
1948. The results are presented in Tables 4-7 and 4-8, which may
be compared with Tables 4-1 and 4-2, respectively. The mean tim-
ing of the three band signals at business cycle peaks is -8, -3, arid +3
months, a slight overall delay relative to the corresponding measures
for the level signals (—10, -2, and +1). At troughs, the average leads
or lags of the two sets of signals are virtually identical.
It should also be noted that sequences of all three peak signals ap-
pear in Table 4-7 only in connection with business cycle recessions,
not growth cycle slowdowns. The latter are associated either with
first and second signals (as in 1951) or with the first signal only (as
in 1962 and 1966). The absence of the P3 signal in each of these in-
stances also rules out any trough signals in the years 1952, 1963, and
1967. In all these respects, there is a basic similarity between the
band signals of Tables 4-7 and 4-8 and the level signals of Tables
4-1 and 4-2. The main difference is the absence of false signals,
which constitutes a substantial advantage of the band approach.
THETIMING OFTHE SIGNALS
AND INFLATION
Ideally,countercyclical policies should be timed so as to also have
some stabilizing effects on prices in general. If the price level in-
creased in business expansions and decreased in business contrac-
tions, the two aims of policy, far from being in any way inconsis-
tent, would actually be complementary. In the 1940s and earlier,
the comprehensive price indexes did tend to fluctuate with the busi-
ness cycle. In the recent era of persistent inflation, the general level
of prices of goods and services no longer shows any comparable
degree of downward flexibility. Thus, as shown in Figure 4-4, the
six-month smoothed rate of change in the consumer price index (to
be called, for simplicity, the CPI rate) became negative in 1949—
1950 and 1954—1955, during and immediately after the first two
business cycle contractions of the post—World War II period; but it
stayed positive during each of the five recessions that occurred in the
following quarter-century.
However, despite the upward trend in inflation since the mid-
1960s, the CPI rate continued to show a cyclical pattern. The oniy
significant declines in this (and other) measures of inflation occurred
•. duringrecessions or, increasingly, in the early recovery phases (Fig-




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































asin 1958-1959, 1970-1972, 1974—1976, and 1980-1981; unfor- Figur
tunately, the accelerations during the expansions in 1968-1969,
1972-1974, nd 1976—1979 were larger yet.22 This suggests that, in
order not to aggravate inflation, countercyclical policies ought to be
strictly confined to periods' of business cycle contraction and early
recovery when the upward pressures on the price level typically
abate. They should not be initiated before the expansion tapers off
and should be discontinued well before the next expansion heats up.
Our system of sequential signals is consistent with these precepts.
If countercyclical policies were not significantly activated until the
third peak signal, P3, and were fully deactivated by the third trough
signal, T3, the relation to the inflation rate would be as shown in
Figure 4—5. Each of the time intervals between P3 and T3 (indicated
by the broken vertical lines bounding the dotted areas) corresponded
closely to a phase of decline in the CPI rate. In the first two cycles,
the off (T3) signals more or less coincided with the local inflation
troughs as represented by the minima of the CPI rate; since 1958,
they have preceded the low points of inflation by several months on
each occasion. Hence the use of the signaling system would produce
counterinflationary as well as countercyclical timing of discretionary
economic policies.
ANUPDATE OF THE SEQUENTIAL
SIGNALINGSYSTEM
Therecent record of the signals, using the "band approach" de-
scribed above, is displayed in Figure 4—6. At the 1981 peak the first
signal came in June 1981, the second in August, and the third in
October. The business cycle peak, as designated later by the National
Bureau, was July 1981. Hence the first signal led the peak by one
month, the second lagged by one month, and the third lagged by
three months. The first signal did not give as early a warning as on
most past occasions, and all three signals were more tightly concen- 198
trated than usual. vide
The first subsequent signal of a trough came in July 1982, when
the growth rate for the leading index reached 1.9 percent, after hay- NOT
ingbeen negative during the preceding twelve months. In August the
growth rate dipped to 0.7 percent, but since this was still within the
—1.0 to +1.0 percent band, the signal was not reversed. In September , 1962
the growth rate rose to 3.9 percent, and it climbed higher in October, cont
November, and December, the latest month as of this writing. Mean-
while, the coincident index growth rate remained negative, so the
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1982, therefore, confirmation that a recovery was underway, as pro-
vided by the second and third signals, was still lacking.
NOTESTO CHAPTER 4
1.ThustheAccelerated Public Works Program wasenacted in September
1962, that is, nineteen months after the end of the 1960—1961 business cycle
contractionas dated by theNBER.For the Public Works ImpactProgram(Au-
gust1971), the lagbehind thetrough ofthe1969—1970recessionwasnine
months.The enactment ofthe LocalPublic Works Programin July 1976 fol-
lowed by sixteen months the NBER reference date for the end of the 1973-
1975 contraction.56 Business Cycles
2.The Public Employment Program was created by the Emergency Em.
ployment Act in July 1971, eight months into the recovery from the 1969—1970
recession. The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (Title VI) was
enacted in December 1974—thirteen months after the business cycle peak, but
three months before the trough as dated by NBER. It is estimated that about
six months elapsed between the allocation of funds and the employment of half
the number of workers (half the direct jobs to be created) under these programs.
The lags with which the policies take effect are, on the average, longer for public
works, where the half-life is of the order of one year. (See Vernez and Vaughan
1978: 48-59).
3. While it is true that some public works (new large projects) have long
implementation lags, others (renovations and small new projects) take much less
time to complete. Public employment service programs have relatively short out-
side lags, with the best results showing 60 percent to 70 percent of the peak
number of jobs filled in six months, as shown for EEA in 1971-1972 and CETA
VI in 1974-1975 by Vernez and Vaughan (1978: 56).
4. Note the following passage from an early, authoritative document:
"Within limits, expenditures for public works can be timed to serve the interests
of stability, but only if a reservoir of engineering studies and blueprints for speL
cific projects has been prepared well in advance of need" (Council of Economic
Advisers 1954: 123).
5. The composite index of "marginal employment adjustments" compiled
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the U.S. Department of Com-
merce includes the average workweek, accession rate, and layoff rate (all in man-
ufacturing) and the average initial claims on state unemployment insurance. Two
of these series (the workweek and the layoff rate) are components of the BEA
index of twelve leading indicators used in the procedure described in the text
below. For a modified version of the employment adjustment index, see Chap-
ter 22, below.
6. This is of necessity but a starkly condensed list which groups together
several types of explanations, e.g., (1) includes accelerator-multiplier models,
hypotheses stressing autonomous investment, disturbances, lags, innovations,
etc.; (2) covers both the older theories that assign a central role to fluctuations
in bank credit and interest rates and the current monetarist theories; and (3)
refers to the roles of cost-price imbalances, volatility of prospective rates of
return, and expectational errors. Nor is this tabulation in any sense exhaustive.
For an overview of business cycle literature with references, see Zarnowitz
1972: 1-38. For a bibliography of indicator studies, see Zarnowitz 1972 and
Chapter 21, below.
7. Careful observation led to an acceptable working definition of business
cycles as a recurrent but not periodic sequence of cumulative expansions and
contractions that spread unevenly over the myriad of processes and participants
that constitute a market economy yet are sufficiently synchronized to show up
as fluctuations in the overall aggregates of real income, output, employment, and
trade. The historical movements display certain well-established and important
(but far from immutable) regularities along with many unique features of the
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Em- essarily mutually exclusive, but there is no unified theory that has succeeded in
1970 explaining all that seems essential about business cycles. Thus, prediction cannot
I) was reliably depend on any single presumptive chain of cause and effect. The compo-
k, but sition of factors that influence the course of the economy can and does vary
.aboUt from one business cycle to another, so some indicators may work better in one
f half environment, others in a different environment. To increase the chances of get-
grams. ting true signals, it is therefore advisable to construct indexes from data of his-
public torically tested usefulness, with diversified economic coverage. It is also impor.
ughan tant and helpful that, in such indexes, much of the independent measurement
error and other noise in the included series are smoothed out.
e long 8. The series are also subjected to a standardization procedure designed to
fch less put them on an equal basis and to prevent the more volatile series from dominat-
t out- ing the index. Further, trend adjustments are used, as noted later in this chapter.
peak For detail on the construction, record, and predictive value of the composite
CETA indexes of cyclical indicators, see Zarnowitz and Boschan 1975a, b; U.S. Depart.
ment of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 1977; Vaccara and Zarno.
ment: witz 1978: 41-50, 1979; and Chapters 24 and 25 below.
2rests 9. Another technique with a good claim to be considered is the use of
r spe- trend-adjusted indexes, again after smoothing. But trend estimation is often dif.
nomic ficult and uncertain, especially near the end of a series, and this is precisely
where attention must be focused in a signaling system.
piled 10. This is done by raising the ratio to the 12/6.5 power (the average of the
Com- twelve preceding months is located 6.5 months before the current month).
man- 11. In fact, the smoothed six.month change at annual rate was found to
-Two compare favorably with a simple twelve-month change, the popular "same
BEA month year ago" comparisons. The latter series, while slightly smoother, lagged
e text behind the former by one or two months at nearly every turn.
Chap- 12. Specifically, the trends are made equal to the average of the long-term
trends in the four components of the index of roughly coincident indicators
gether (number of employees on nonagricultural payrolls; index of industrial produc.
odels, tion; personal income less transfer payments in constant dollars; manufacturing
itions, and trade sales in constant dollars). For each of these monthly series, a loglinear
ations trend is computed by converting the percentage change from the centered mi-
d (3) tial cycle average (1949—1954) to the centered terminal cycle average (1970—
es of 1975) into a monthly rate by the compound interest formula. (For further de-
stive. tails, see U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 1977:
owitz 74—76, 1979: 157.) The target trend will be reestimated each time a new trough.
2 and to-trough cycle is completed in the four coincident indicators. Frequent updat-
ing of the target trend rate is not practicable, but this should not cause any seri-
iness ous errors because the change in the secular trend of the economy is gradual and
s and small in the short run.
pants 13. Theoretically, business cycle contractions could likewise be interrupted
up by high-growth phases, but there are no instances of this sort in recent history.
it, and and none would be expected in times when all recessions are relatively short. In
,brtant the seven completed business cycles of the post—World War II period (1945-
the 1980), the contractions ranged in length from six to sixteen months and aver-
nec- aged ten months.
L58 Business Cycles
14.The series represent aggregate output, employment and unemployment,
income, and sales; all are in constant dollars or physical units or quantity index
numbers. The trends are estimated by interpolation between segments deter-
mined with the aid of ratios to long (seventy-five-month or twenty-five-quarter)
centered moving averages; they are estimated so as to cut through and contain
no significant elements of the short cyclical movements in the series. Various
composite and diffusion indexes based on the same set of indicators are used as
well. (For further detail and applications, see Zarnowitz and Boschan 1977: 34-
38; Zarnowitz and Moore 1977.)
15. The rates of growth actually used in this chapter are smoothed six-month
changes in annualized form, as described in the text. Of course, these indexes,
likeany others built from real economic indicators, contain much "noise," short
erratic movements, which are entirely disregarded in Figure 4—1.
16. The coincident index rate was below 3.3 percent for five months in 1956
and was negative in one month. In 1959, it was below 3.3 percent (and negative)
for two months.
17. The following tabulation compares the lags of the third signal with those
involved in the recovery of the coincident index to its previous peak level (in the
1980-81 recovery the index did not regain its peak level):
Business Cycle Trough
Lag of Third Signal
(months)
Lag of Recovery in
the Coincident Index
(months)
Oct. 1949 5 8
May 1954 7 12
April 1958 7 13
Feb. 1961 6 9
Nov. 1970 12 13
March 1975 8 24
Average 8 13
18. The main reason for the large revisions in the preliminary index is that it
is constructed from only ten of the twelve components. The figures for the two
components (net business formation and net change in inventories on hand and
on order in 1972 dollars) are not yet available. These figures are added to the
index one month later in the first revision (however, lately the figures for the net
business formation have lagged two months). The preliminary coincident index
is based on three of the four components (the figures for manufacturing and
trade sales in 1972 dollars are added one month later in the first revision).
19. The content and method of constructing the composite indexes of cycli-
cal indicators were altered in several aspects by the compiling agency in 1976.
(See U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 1977, for
more information.)
20. See Zarnowitz and Moore 1981.
21. The standard deviation of the irregular component of the leading index
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yment, 22. During much of the 197 3—1974 recession (through September 1974), the
index CPI rate continued on an upward course, largely reflecting the earlier "supply
deter- shocks" of sharp rises in prices of imported oil and other materials. Such a long
uarter) and large increase in the inflation rate during a period of business contraction
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